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Appendix
Here we prove equibrium existence, as well as the properties stated in Propo-
sition 2. Existence and quasi-competitiveness are proved mainly for later
convenience – indeed, our model satis…es the conditions studied by Amir and
Lambson (2000), who generalize previous work by MacManus (1964) and
Roberts and Sonnenschein (1976). Convergence to the competitive limit has
been studied by Ru¢n (1971) under conditions on demand more restrictive
than ours.
We gather here our assumptions:
(1) C(0) = 0, C 0(q) ¸ 0 and C 00(q) ¸ 0 for q > 0;
(2) C 0M(q) ¸ 0 for q > 0
(3) ymin · C 0(0) < ymax
(4) f(y) > 0 for y 2 (ymin; ymax)
Existence
At a symmetric equilibrium, the two (…rst and second order) conditions are
1
n
(1¡ F (p¤; µ))¡ [p¤ ¡ C 0( 1
n
(1¡ F (p¤; µ))]f(p¤; µ) = 0 (A.1)
¡f(p¤; µ)[2 + C 00(¢)f(p¤; µ)]¡ [p¤ ¡ C 0(¢)]@f(p¤;µ)
@p
< 0 (A.2)
We show that (i) for any n ¸ 1, there is a p¤ such that (A.1) and (A.2)
are satis…ed; (ii) pro…ts are non negative, depending (obviously) on K. Of
course, (i) and (ii) together make up a short run Cournot equilibrium.
(i) To ease notation, (A.1) can be written as h(p¤; n; µ) = 0, where
h(p; n; µ) ´ 1
n
(1 ¡ F (p; µ)) ¡ [p ¡ C 0( 1
n
(1 ¡ F (p; µ))]f(p; µ). For any given
…nite n > 0 and µ, h(ymin; n; µ) = 1n ¡ [ymin ¡C 0
¡
1
n
¢
]f(ymin; µ) > 0: trivially,
if f(ymin; µ) = 0; but also if f(ymin; µ) > 0, since C 00(¢) ¸ 0 implies C 0(1=n) ¸
C 0(0) ¸ ymin by Assumption 3. On other hand, there is a bp · ymax such that
h(bp; n; µ) < 0: bp = ymax if f(ymax) > 0, as ¡[ymax ¡ C 0 (0)]f(ymax; µ) < 0;
while if f(ymax) = 0 we note that
@h(ymax;n;µ)
@p
= ¡[ymax ¡ C 0 (0)]@f(ymax;µ)@p > 0
by Assumption 4 (implying @f(ymax;µ)
@p
< 0), so that h(bp; n; µ) < 0 for any bp
close enough to ymax. By continuity, there exists a p¤ 2 (ymin; ymax) such that
h(p¤; n; µ) = 0. To prove (A.2), note that h crosses the 0-axis at least once
from above; let p¤ be one such crossing point, where clearly @h(p
¤;n;µ)
@p
< 0: we
have 0 < ¡@h(p¤;n;µ)
@p
= @f(p
¤;µ)
@p
[p¤¡C 0(¢)]+[1+ 1
n
C 00(¢)f(p¤; µ)]f(p¤; µ)+ f(p¤;µ)
n
· @f(p¤;µ)
@p
[p¤¡C 0(¢)] +f(p¤; µ)[2+C 00(¢)f(p¤; µ)]: The last inequality holds for
any n ¸ 1.
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(ii) There has to be a value K > 0, such that for all K · K equilibrium
pro…ts are non negative. This is directly implied by Assumption 2, as (for
any …nite n) p¤ > CM( 1n(1 ¡ F (p¤; µ)): hence, for K = 0 pro…ts are strictly
positive at such n, and there follows that such K exists.
Quasi-competitiveness
Since p¤ satis…es h(p¤; n; µ) = 0, clearly dp¤=dn = ¡@h
@n
=@h
@p
. We know from
the above that at p¤, @h
@p
< 0. On the other hand, for given p¤, @h
@n
= ¡ 1
n2
[(1¡
F (p¤; µ)) + C 00(¢)f(p¤; µ)] < 0. Hence p¤ decreases as n increases.
Monotonic convergence
In order to prove that limK!0 p¤(n(K; µ); µ) = C 0(0), we …rst note that
limK!0 n(K; µ) = 1: by Assumption 2, for any …nite n pro…t is positive
at K = 0, since p¤ > CM : Now observe that limn!1 p¤(n; µ) = C 0(0). To
this end, suppose to the contrary that
lim
n!1
p¤(n; µ) = bp 6= C 0(0)
Then we would have
lim
n!1
h(p¤; n; µ) = 0¡ [bp¡ C 0(0)]f(bp; µ) 6= 0
which cannot be, since it violates (A.1).
As to monotonicity, it is easily checked that the long run equilibrium
number of …rms n¤(K; µ) veri…es @n¤=@K < 0. Indeed, by the zero pro…t
condition b¼(p¤(n); µ)¡K = 0 (where b¼(p¤(n); µ) is gross pro…ts), and using
quasi-competitiveness, one can see that db¼=dn < 0 and hence @n¤=@K < 0.
Monotonicity of p¤ then follows.
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